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The role of the gender diversity of audit committees in modelling the quality of 
management earnings forecasts of initial public offers in Malaysia 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – Presently, one of the major governance issues faced by management and shareholders 
of organizations is the gender composition of the boards of directors and audit committees. This 
study aims to examine the impact of audit committee gender on the accuracy of management 
earnings forecasts disclosure in IPO prospectuses. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The study sample comprises 190 Malaysian companies 
issuing IPOs that transformed into public companies during the period 2002-2012. Earnings 
forecasts accuracy (quality) is proxied by absolute forecast error and the study model is 
developed based on the frameworks of the signaling theory, the agency theory and the resource-
dependence theory. 
 
Findings – The study proposes that female directors introduce a set of specific features to the 
boardroom that serve to improve investors’ protection and efficient monitoring of management. 
However, according to the findings, an insignificantly positive relationship exists between audit 
committee gender and absolute forecast error, which shows that more female directors in the 
audit committee could translate into more errors and less accuracy in earnings forecasts. 
Practical implications – Considering the recent regulatory developments that encourage the 
number of women on the board of directors, the findings obtained have significant implications 
for policymakers. The study findings can also be invaluable to investors, investment analysts, 
market players and researchers. 
Originality/value – The composition of the board of directors and audit committee in terms of 
gender plays a significant role in the promotion of effective corporate governance practices. This 
study is one of the pioneering studies that examines the advantages of gender diversity in the 
board of directors. It is also the first study to extend IPO literature by investigating the role of 
audit committee gender in the enhancement of accurate management earnings forecasts included 




The audit committee has a major role in management oversight, monitoring and advising 





































statement preparation. In prior literature, studies have focused on some audit committee 
characteristics related to the accuracy of earnings forecasts. Among them, Ahmad-Zaluki and 
Wan-Hussin (2010) report that audit committees with more members and higher proportion of 
independent directors are associated with higher forecast accuracy. Truong and Dunstan (2011) 
state that companies with boards and audit committees chairing more directors experienced in 
accounting are expected to release more accurate earnings forecasts. In the present study, a 
distinct audit committee characteristic, namely female directorship on the audit committee, is 
focused on. According to Cormier et al. (2014), little evidence is available, and several issues are 
still unanswered concerning the impact of audit committee on the accuracy of initial public 
offerings’ (IPOs) earnings forecasts.   
 
In the context of female managers, Hurley and Choudhary (2016) reveal that women have 
several skills that are invaluable to the management and leaders. In fact, advocates of board 
reform around the globe have urged for the increase in the number of women directors on boards 
by stating that diversity in gender can improve the effectiveness of the board (Higgs, 2003). 
Following the recent corporate scandals and financial crises, the question, “if more female 
directors had been directing the US companies and the companies all over the world, would 
things have turned out differently?” has been asked (Adams and Funk, 2012). In discussion 
circles, the lack of females on the board of directors is becoming a heated debate that needs to be 
addressed due to the advantages that can be obtained from gender diversity on the board 
(Julizaerma and Sori, 2012). This indicates that the female directors’ percentage on the board has 
become a major topic in the field of corporate governance around the globe (Liang et al., 2013) 
and it has earned the interest of many stakeholders, including academic researchers, business 





































light on the importance of diversity of the board of directors and audit committees in terms of 
ethnicity, gender and education, among others (Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki, 2014). Also, Ahmad-
Zaluki (2012) suggests that companies issuing IPOs should adopt steps that acknowledge and 
optimize their human capital, with the inclusion of females on the board of directors. 
 
Unlike available studies in literature, this study is unique as it investigates whether or not 
gender diversity in the audit committee affects the management earnings forecasts in terms of its 
accuracy as issued in the IPO prospectuses. The focus of this study is on the earnings forecasts 
accuracy owing to the significant amount of information that can be obtained from the IPO 
prospectuses. One aspect of this information, i.e., management of earnings forecasts and its 
accuracy, has become an area of great interest. Capital market players are dependent on 
information, such as accurate earnings forecasts, for them to evaluate risk, make decisions 
concerning future prospects and assess a company’s equity. We focus on gender in the audit 
committee rather than the board of directors as the responsibilities of management’s financial 
discretion oversight lie in the hands of the audit committee – in fact, the committee is considered 
as the most reliable safeguarding entity of public interests. Moreover, the audit committee 
monitors and safeguards financial disclosure when it comes to the process of financial reporting 
(Liu et al., 2014). In other words, audit committees hold higher responsibilities for monitoring 
voluntary disclosure, such as management forecasts and financial reporting (Liu and Zhuang, 
2011). This is supported by Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010) who report that effective 
audit committees monitor IPO earnings forecasts accuracy.  
Thus, it is important to determine how gender diversity can contribute to the performance 





































and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011), gender diversity can contribute to the quality of the 
discussions of the board and increase its ability to oversee the disclosures and reports of the 
company. Similarly, Ming and Eam (2016) show that female directors can positively contribute 
to the return on equity of companies in Malaysia. Peni and Va¨ha¨maa (2010) state that female 
directors may enhance earnings quality. 
 
This study is justified based on the following two factors: first, gender is focused on as 
several governance reform proposals have indicated that female directors can effectively 
influence a company’s governance. Stated more clearly, this study is motivated by the call of 
several stakeholders, like investors, regulators and academics, for a more diverse board in public 
organizations. This call has been, time and again, brought up in several countries that have a 
quota for female board representation; for instance, in Malaysia, gender composition is a national 
policy (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2012). More specifically, the Malaysian government passed a ruling in 
June 2011 that at least 30% of the positions in decision-making in the corporate sector have to be 
occupied by women to achieve equality in gender diversity in the workplace [1]. The same goes 
for several European countries, including Norway, Spain, and Sweden, that have passed laws 
that mandate companies to include more female directors on their boards. Meanwhile, in the US, 
stakeholders (regulators, shareholder advocacy groups and large institutional investors) have 
urged that gender diversity on boards must be increased. 
Second, examining the management earnings forecasts quality can provide insights into 
the companies’ disclosures. The relevant question to be asked in this case is whether or not 
female audit committee members of companies issuing IPOs make more informed and accurate 





































counterparts. Gender diversity may also result in improved earnings forecasts accuracy based on 
the proposition that: 1) gender diversity improves boards’ capability of monitoring management 
to enhance independence (Gul et al., 2008) that will lead to better functioning of internal 
governance systems; 2) gender diversity boosts board attendance and eke more responsibility for 
management; and 3) gender diversity improves the boards’ decision-making ability with the 
addition of distinct perceptions, enhanced creativity and superior innovative methods (Carter et 
al., 2010). 
 
This study is expected to contribute to extant literature in many ways: first, we show that 
it is not merely the presence of outsiders on the audit committee but the different points of view 
(i.e., of women members) that contribute to more effective decision-making. This study adds 
information to the debate concerning audit committee composition as it examines the hypothesis 
of whether or not gender diversity affects corporate governance in productive ways. Despite the 
trends and legislation in the global market of more diversified boards, only a few studies have 
been carried out on gender diversity and its influence on financial disclosure users. Also, past 
studies on Malaysian IPO earnings forecasts, like Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010), have 
confined their examination to the role of executive and non-executive directors in the audit 
committee. To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, no empirical evidence has been put forth 
on the effect of gender on IPO audit committees and earnings forecasts accuracy. Therefore, this 
study adds to prior research by identifying an additional determinant of management earnings 
forecasts. More specifically, it is an important step towards understanding how the greater 





































The second contribution of the study to the body of knowledge is in fulfilling the requests 
of prior studies; for instance, Huang et al. (2011) and Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) recommend 
future studies investigate the effect of gender diversity in the audit committee on earnings quality 
and earnings management. Additionally, Habib and Hossain (2013) request future studies to 
examine whether or not management forecasts differ in companies owing to gender 
diversification in management. 
 
The third contribution lies in the fact that companies issuing IPOs often encounter 
information asymmetry between their shareholders and potential investors as evidenced by 
Bédard et al. (2008) and Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki (2016). Accurate earnings forecasts 
disclosure can minimize such asymmetries and demonstrate the actual position of companies 
issuing IPOs to the potential investors and level the playing field between informed and 
uninformed investors. Therefore, regulatory agencies and market participants in Malaysia or 
elsewhere are concerned whether or not the earnings forecasts in the IPO prospectuses are 
accurate. Thus, as gender diversity can contribute to the quality of financial disclosure, this study 
has some useful implications for policymakers in their attempt to increase the diversity of 
directors in corporate boardrooms. The study also has some significant implications for investors 
and managers concerning the appointment of both male and female directors to corporate boards. 
  
Employing a sample of 190 Malaysian companies issuing IPOs, this study provides 
empirical evidence concerning the role of female directors in the audit committee in IPOs that 
went public from the 2002 to 2012 period. This study finds positive relationships between audit 
committee gender and absolute forecast error, indicating that the more the female directors in the 






































The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a review of literature and the 
research hypothesis development; Section 3 is on the research methods and Section 4 provides 
the study results. Section 5 presents the conclusion of the study.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Prior studies on gender diversity 
Dutta and Bose (2007) define gender diversity as the presence of women directors on the 
company’s board of directors. Several theories have touched upon this topic, including the 
agency theory, resource-dependence theory and signaling theory. For instance, Carter et al. 
(2003) shed light on the relationship between gender diversity and company value based on the 
agency theory by Fama and Jensen (1983). They relate that increased diversity may result in 
more board independence as females have a higher tendency to raise questions compared to their 
male counterparts. Also, women directors on the board of directors are expected to promote 
board diligence (Gul et al., 2008). Further, Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2010) indicate that gender 
diversity could reinforce current control mechanisms over executives and managers. Westphal 
and Milton (2000) report that the agency-theoretic rationale for the positive impact of female 
directors on financial performance is related to the fact that females can bring a fresh perspective 
on difficult issues, and this can enhance accurate informational biases in designing the strategies 
and solving the problems. 
 
Meanwhile, from the resource-dependence theory perspective, companies are more 
capable of attracting, employing and preserving a stream of resources from their external 





































resources. This is explained by Hillman et al. (2000) who state that because boards provide the 
related tasks between the company and the external environment, a board with female directors 
could mean more network choices and opportunities for the company. 
  
As for the signaling theory, it posits that companies use evident signals to promote their 
reputation and status (Miller and Triana, 2009). Such signals are used by external users in their 
decisions concerning the company and influence the way financial analysts, investors and other 
stakeholders think about the company (Bhat et al., 2006). Similarly, Gul et al. (2013) state that 
the company’s commitment to promote gender diversity is an informational signal that affects 
the external environment (e.g., media and financial analysts). Women directors improve the 
performance of the company by making effective decisions and this signals to the external 
stakeholders that the company is providing accurate financial information (Habib and Hossain, 
2013). 
Empirically, previous studies, like Krishnan and Parsons (2008), provide evidence that 
gender diversity among senior management is positively related to earnings reporting quality. 
They also show that companies with more females in senior management positions have reported 
higher profitability and greater stock returns after IPOs, compared to other companies with a 
lower percentage of females in senior management positions. Their findings argue that earnings 
of companies with higher gender diversity are more sensitive to bad news than the earnings of 
companies with lower gender diversity. Similarly, Peni and Va¨ha¨maa (2010) show that a 
woman working as Chief Financial Officer (CFO) has a highly significant and positive effect on 
earnings quality. They say that female CFOs follow more conservative strategies about financial 





































ceiling phenomenon, earnings quality might be increased by having female CFOs because 
women possess greater requirements to be appointed in the company. 
Moreover, Gul et al. (2011) report that the stock prices of companies that practice gender 
diversity on their boards, reveal greater information, i.e., earnings quality is related to greater 
stock price informativeness. They find this association to be stronger and clearer for companies 
that have weak corporate governance, which proposes that gender diversity may perform as an 
alternative method for weak corporate governance. Similar  results are  also  found  in  the  study  
of  Srinidhi  et  al. (2011). They argue that including women directors on the board and/or the 
audit committee is a credible method for developing the quality of companies’ reporting and 
raising the confidence of investors in financial statements.   
In their study, Gul et al. (2007) report that companies that have at least one woman on 
their boards or audit committees are shown to be related to less earnings management. They 
explain that since the directors provide the females with greater access to time and voluntary 
information in an environment of less doubt, these women appear to be more effective 
transformational leaders. Such access to more voluntary information reduces the information 
asymmetry between the women directors and the managers of companies and leads to less 
manipulated earnings. Additionally, women show higher risk aversion in financial decision-
making and are less over-confident than men, particularly in functions where the feedback is 
uncertain. 
Furthermore, Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) indicate that the presence of a woman director 
in the audit committee leads to improving the governance of the audit committee in terms of 





































presence of women results in increasing the meeting frequency of the audit committee, and 
thereby its activities. Likewise, Gavious et al. (2012) find a negative association between the 
presence of women directors and the level of earnings management.  In addition, they show that 
accounting aggressiveness is impacted by the proportion of women in audit committees and on 
boards of directors. Additionally, their study finds that when either the CEO or the CFO is a 
woman, the level of earnings management is lower. Their findings can be explained by the fact 
that women do not involve themselves in risks inherent in earnings management because they do 
not like and fear negative consequences for reporting manipulated earnings as well as due to 
moral considerations. Their evidence about the effect of CFO’s gender on earnings quality is 
consistent with the results of Peni and Va¨ha¨maa (2010). 
Additionally, in relation to the association between gender and conservatism, female 
CFOs are evidenced to be related to significantly improved accounting conservatism in financial 
reporting in comparison to their male counterparts (Francis et al., 2009). According to the studies 
outlined above, the inclusion of female directors on the board and/or in the audit committee is an 
effective decision that works towards the development of the quality of reporting and investors’ 
confidence in the financial statements. 
In other studies dedicated to the relationship between gender and financial performance, 
like Erhardt et al. (2003) and Liu et al. (2014), and between gender and company value, like 
Carter et al. (2003), the authors have reported a positive relationship between the proportion of 
women directors and the company’s financial performance as well as its value. Past literature has 
evidenced that gender diversity in a company could lead to a general knowledge repository that 





































such, gender diversity is also associated with improved shareholder value. Furthermore, female 
directors on the board enhance board independence, and in turn, protect shareholders’ interests. 
In sum, prior studies have evidenced that women directors improve the monitoring 
process, offer superior governance practices, simplify the disclosure of value and mitigate 
information asymmetry. As a consequence, gender diversity results in improved information 
disclosure and with better disclosure, superior disclosure earnings forecasts are provided. This 
study proposes a positive link between audit committee gender diversity and the average level of 
earnings forecasts accuracy. Hence, consistent with the resource-dependence and signaling 
theories, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H1. Audit committee gender diversity is positively associated with the accuracy of management 
earnings forecasts included in the IPO prospectuses.  
 
2.2 Prior studies on other factors influencing earnings forecasts 
Besides the gender variable, this study reviewed prior studies to determine control factors that 
have the potential to affect the accuracy of management earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses. 
These control variables are board characteristics (size, independence, CEO duality), signaling 
variables (underwriter’s reputation and auditor’s quality) and IPO company-specific 
characteristics (size, age and forecast horizon). These variables are included in this study to 
estimate whether or not audit committee gender influences the accuracy of IPO management 
earnings forecasts. 
 
Literature reviewed evidences the aforementioned factors do have an influence. Firstly, 





































to the board of directors’ authority over the control of audit committee members, it holds a major 
responsibility for determining the level of expertise and independence of the committee. Hence, 
audit committee effectiveness can be influenced by the board’s governance as it operates in the 
company (Bédard and Gendron, 2010). Therefore, this study considers board attributes in the 
study model as control variables.  
 
Narrowing the argument further, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) show that companies 
with smaller boards have a tendency to disclose more conservative earnings forecasts. Similarly, 
Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) contend that the harmonization and processing of issues are likely 
to be challenging in extremely large boards as they tend to be less effective in their monitoring 
responsibility. Meanwhile, Mnif (2010) explains that companies issuing IPOs having large 
boards disclose positive but less accurate earnings forecasts. Therefore, in this study, large-sized 
boards are posited to have a negative influence on the directors’ monitoring responsibility and 
expected to have an adverse relationship with the disclosure of accurate management earnings 
forecasts. 
 
Moving on to board independence, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) evidence a positive 
relationship between board independence and quality of earnings forecasts. According to Mnif 
(2010), companies issuing IPOs are expected to provide conservative and accurate earnings 
forecasts when they have a greater proportion of independent directors on the board. Hence, the 
present study posits a positive relationship between the percentage of independent directors and 






































Furthermore, with regards to the separation between the responsibilities of the CEO and 
Chairman of the board, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2000 
recommends it. In this regard, Yang and Kao (2007) show that if the Chairman also adopts the 
position of the chief executive, it will lead to favorable decisions and hence mitigate oversight 
functions of the board, which will eventually lead to decreased earnings credibility. Added to 
this, Abbott et al. (2000) evidence a positive association between CEO duality and the possibility 
of the companies’ aggressive reporting or fraud. In this study, a negative relationship between 
CEO duality and accurate IPO management earnings forecasts is proposed.  
 
As for quality auditors, Aharony et al. (1993) argue that reputable auditors and 
underwriters are more incentivized to provide quality and accurate information concerning IPOs 
in order to steer clear of litigation risks and loss of prestige. As a consequence, earnings 
management practice is more likely to be reported and highlighted by quality auditors and 
underwriters (Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2011). Additionally, Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2011) explain that 
directors of companies issuing IPOs are more likely to agree with quality auditors and 
underwriters when the signaling benefits overtake the expected IPO short-run wealth loss 
stemming from mitigated earnings management. Essentially, the audit committee is responsible 
for enhancing the interaction between the board and auditors and in the preservation and 
improvement of external auditors’ independence. In sum, quality auditors and underwriters 
would be inclined to maintain their reputation and as such, IPO prospectuses preparation with 
accurate information would help in doing so. 
 
Lastly, several company-specific characteristics are considered in this study as control 





































forecasts. These include company size, age and forecast horizon. This is supported by prior 
empirical studies, like Jelic et al. (1998) and Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010). 
 
With regards to size, larger companies issuing IPOs control and manage their market 
settings and in doing so, they may easily make forecasts (Chen and Firth, 1999). Such companies 
have been evidenced to have stable earnings process and a tendency to employ several resources 
to undertake accurate earnings forecasts. According to Clarkson (2000), larger companies 
disclose more accurate earnings forecasts compared to their smaller counterparts. This study 
therefore assumes that the size of the company positively relates to the accuracy of IPO 
management earnings forecasts. 
 
Moving on to company age, Lee et al. (1993) report that companies issuing IPOs that are 
older have a greater tendency to provide better forecasts of their future performance as they are 
expected to obtain higher market appreciation and have greater control over their company’s 
operations. Also, Jaggi (1997) indicates that young companies issuing IPOs often fail to 
completely understand and value the influence of the environment on their future performance, 
and hence, their forecasts are not so accurate. Furthermore, Jelic et al. (1998) and Jog and 
McConomy (2003) evidence that companies lacking operating history often encounter challenges 
in forecasting their earnings. Hence, in this study, disclosure accuracy of earnings forecasts is 
assumed to be better in older companies.  
 
Past studies have also argued that the level of forecast accuracy depends on the time 
horizon concerning the forecasts (e.g., Lee et al., 1993; Brown et al., 2000). For instance, Jaggi 





































compared to a long-time horizon as higher uncertainty is associated with the latter. Similarly, 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) report that less accurate earnings forecasts are related to a longer 
time period from the forecast date to the forecasted end date. This study therefore assumes that 
forecast horizon is negatively related to the accurate disclosure of earnings forecasts. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Sample selection and data collection 
This study depended on IPO prospectuses and annual reports of companies issuing IPOs 
included in the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia from January 2002 to 29 February, 2012. This 
period is used owing to its superiority over a shorter period, as the latter is more susceptible to 
unexpected events. In addition, this period allowed us to have sufficient samples to investigate 
the issue of this study. The ending period of the study is 2012 as the issuing of earnings forecasts 
became voluntary in 2008 instead of mandatory and it is rare to find companies that have issued 
earnings forecasts after 2012. In the period of study, 265 new issues were listed on the Main 
Market of Bursa Malaysia. For the purpose of this study, companies issuing IPOs refer to those 
that meet the following conditions: 
1. Companies issuing IPOs whose prospectuses and annual reports for the IPO year are available; 
and 
2. Companies issuing IPOs whose prospectuses contain information regarding their earnings 
forecasts. 
 
Following Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin’s (2010), 
this study did not include financial, close-end fund and real estate investment trust companies in  





































practices. As a result, 54 companies issuing IPOs without earnings forecasts and 21 categorized 
as having distinct regulatory regimes were left out. The final study sample comprised 190 
companies issuing IPOs. 
All the information concerning audit committee gender, board attributes, signaling 
variables and company-specific characteristics were manually collected from the IPO 
prospectuses provided in the Bursa Malaysia website (www.bursamalaysia.com.my) or the IPO 
company’s website. The forecasted earnings were obtained from the prospectuses, while the 
actual earnings were obtained from the first published annual reports.  
 
3.2 Measurement of quality of earnings forecasts 
In this study, the quality of earnings forecasts was measured by the absolute forecast error (proxy 
for earnings forecast accuracy). The absolute forecast error was calculated by subtracting 
absolute value of actual earnings from the forecasted earnings and divided by the forecasted 
earnings. The absolute forecast error was calculated by using the following formula: 
 
 
AFERi,T= | FERi,T| 
AFERi,T=│ (AEi,T–FEi,T) │/ │FEi,T│  
Where: 
AFERi,T= Absolute forecast error; 
AEi,T= Actual earnings of company i for the period T; and 






































The AFER average depicts the general accuracy level without considering whether or not 
the forecast is optimistic or pessimistic. Additionally, AFER offers information as to the 
proximity of the forecasts to the actual earnings. According to Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), 




3.3 Model of earnings forecasts quality 
In this study, a multivariate analysis was conducted to determine the factors that influence the 
accuracy of IPO management earnings forecasts. The AFER level was regressed on audit 
committee gender and on the eight control variables comprising board characteristics, signaling 
variables and company-specific characteristics. Hence, the study model is represented as follows: 
 
AFERi = β0 + β1 GENDER+ β2 BSIZE + β3 BIND + β4 DUALITY + β5 UNDERW+ β6 AUD+ β7 
CSIZE+ β8 CAGE+ β9 FHORIZON+ εi 
 
Where AFER denotes absolute forecast error measured by calculating the absolute value of the 
difference between actual earnings and the forecasted earnings scaled by the absolute earnings 
forecasts; GENDER denotes the female directors’ proportion on the audit committee to the total 
number of directors at the IPO date; BSIZE denotes the total number of directors on the board at 
the IPO date; BIND stands for the proportion of independent directors on the board to the total 
number of directors at the IPO date; and DUALITY stands for the binary variable with the value 
of “1” in case the CEO is also the board’s chairman, and otherwise with the value of “0”. 
Meanwhile, UNDERW denotes the ringgit value of all the underwritten shares by the 





































variable with the value of “1” if the IPO company is audited by a Big-4 firm, and otherwise with 
the value of “0”; CSIZE denotes the IPO company size gauged through the natural logarithm of 
total assets at the IPO date; and CAGE stands for the IPO company’s age measured by the 
natural logarithm of 1 plus number of years from the incorporation date to the IPO prospectus 
date. Lastly, FHORIZON denotes the earnings forecasts period measured as the number of 
months from the IPO prospectus date to the end of the year that the earnings forecasts pertain to. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the experimental variable, namely audit committee gender and 
control variables, namely board characteristics, signaling variables and company-specific 
characteristics are displayed in Table 1. For all the continuous variables, their mean, median, 
minimum, maximum and standard deviation are listed, while for the dummy variables, the 
proportion difference is included. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
According to Table 1, the absolute forecast error (AFER) mean is 24.94%, with a median 
of 9.37%.  Prior results in the Malaysian context by Jelic et al. (1998) show the mean at 54.91% 
which is more than the mean found in this study. However, Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin 
(2010) report a similar mean at 23.76%. As for the previous results on international studies, the 
AFER in this study is less than that reported in Australia (1138.30%) by Lee et al. (1993); and in 
Jordan (163.40%) by El-Rajabi and Gunasekaran (2006). This study’s AFER mean is however 
higher compared to those in the UK (11.00%) by Keasey and McGuinness (1991); and Singapore 





































unsatisfactory but this is a slight improvement from past AFER findings. However, compared to 
the UK and Singapore, companies issuing IPOs still require more accurate earnings forecasts. 
 
As for the mean of the proportion of female directors in the IPO audit committee denoted 
by GENDER, it is found to be 7.96% in spite of the Malaysian government’s policy of raising  
female participation from 13.5% (2004) to 26.20% (2010) in the private sector as part of the 
Tenth Malaysia Plan. This moderately low percentage of women directors is lower than the 
results found by Ahmad-Zaluki (2012) who report it to be 8.08%. Therefore, it can be stated that 
gender diversity is limited and is somewhat less pronounced in executive positions, like boards 
of directors and audit committees. 
 
Regarding the statistics of board characteristics, to begin with, the mean of board size 
(BSIZE) is seven for the entire sample; it is notable that all the companies issuing IPOs have 
more than four directors on the board. As for board independence (BIND), the average board 
comprises independent directors and the mean is 37.57% with a median of 33.33%. In this 
regard, the 164 companies issuing IPOs (86%) adhere to the mandate by MCCG (2000) in that a 
minimum of one third of the board members must be non-executive directors. This reveals the 
domination of insiders on the board of Malaysian companies issuing IPOs. 
  
There were only 31 companies issuing IPOs with CEO duality (DUALITY), and the 
mean was found to be 16.32%. This shows a high level of compliance with the MCCG 
recommendation and the infrequent trend of role duality in Malaysian IPOs. With regards to 
underwriter’s reputation (UNDERW), the sample companies have some share issues 





































the companies in the sample. On the whole, the mean of underwriter’s market share is 19.05%. 
In addition, auditor choice is tilted towards the Big-4 firms, as 54.74% of the sample constituting 
104 companies issuing IPOs was audited by such firms.  
 
Table 1 also lists the descriptive statistics for the various companies issuing IPO 
controlled attributes. The companies vary in terms of their size (CSIZE) with the average size of 
RM350.11 million. The companies also vary in terms of operating history (CAGE), with more 
than half of them having been in business from 0-6 years, and with the maximum age being 
32.67 years and the minimum, a few months. Moving on to mean of forecast horizon 
(FHORIZON), it is 7.71 months, varying from three to 14 months. As a consequence, although 
the IPO took place towards the end of the financial year, management still reported earnings 
forecasts in their prospectuses.  
 
4.2 Univariate analysis based on female and male audit committee members 
In this section, the univariate analysis of the variables is discussed. All the variables are 
categorized on the basis of audit committee members (female and male). The principle used 
behind the IPO sample division based on gender enables the study to provide an insight into the 
effectiveness of audit committee gender, aside from board attributes, signaling variables and 
company-specific characteristics. 
 
According to the statistics in Table 2, companies issuing IPOs with female audit 
committee directors reveal a greater mean of AFER of 35.18% compared to those with male only 





































parametric Mann-Whitney test show insignificant differences between the two groups in terms of 
female and male audit committee directors. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.3 Multiple regression analysis 
The Pearson correlation coefficients obtained between the dependent variable (AFER), 
independent variable (GENDER) and control variables are presented in Table 3. From the 
results, it is evident that no significant correlations are found between AFER and GENDER. It is 
notable that a positive sign on audit committee gender indicates that to some extent, it leads to 
lower accuracy of management earnings forecasts. Moreover, all the control variables have no 
significant relationships with AFER. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The multiple regression analysis results for the study model that relate to audit committee 
gender and earnings forecasts accuracy are displayed in Table 4. The Table shows that the F-
value of the model is significant at the 1% level, with an adjusted R square of 6.60%. This 
indicates that the model explains 6.60% of the total variance in the earnings forecasts accuracy. 
Although the adjusted R square level is low, to a certain extent, it is higher than the one 
documented by Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010), which is 3.00%. Further, Chen et al. 
(2001) indicate that successfully explaining cross-sectional differences in forecast errors appears 
elusive. In their study about audit committee characteristics in financially distressed and non‐
distressed companies, Rahmat et al. (2009) report R square of 4.7% for their basic regression of 
tested variables. They indicate that this low R square is common in studies that have investigated 





































[Insert Table 4 here] 
It is clear from Table 4 that GENDER has a positive and significant relationship with 
AFER (i.e., negative with IPO earnings forecasts accuracy). In other words, the result indicates 
that the proportion of women directors on the audit committee is not positively related to the 
accuracy of earnings forecasts. Stated more clearly, this result neither supports the resource-
dependence theory which suggests that female directors are important for the company nor the 
signaling theory which suggests that gender diversity can be used as informational signal 
impacting the external environment. This result is consistent with the univariate analysis that 
finds more female members in the audit committee leads to less accuracy.  
 
This result may be attributed to the relatively small percentage of female audit committee 
members in the Malaysian companies issuing IPOs. Such small proportion does not allow them 
to be influential in following a different oversight technique. The result may also indicate that 
female directors are merely an indication of gender diversity and not significant in carrying out 
the responsibilities of the board and audit committee. 
 
The result may also be explained by Ahmad-Zaluki’s (2012) study that reveals IPO 
Malaysian companies are still unaware of the effect women have on their company’s 
performance because of the feminine characteristics they contribute to top management levels. 
Added to this, the experience of female executives is still less than their male counterparts 
(Berger et al., 2014). Such findings may be justified also by the socio-psychological attitude that 
female directors are often characterized by the barriers that prevent them from reaching the 





































Generally speaking, the finding does not necessarily contradict the view that the 
contribution of female directors on the board and audit committees of companies issuing IPOs 
may be good. It suggests that a lower number of female directors on the audit committee of such 
companies does not provide them with sufficient power of oversight to increase the accuracy of 
management earnings forecasts in the prospectus. This conclusion may add strength to the 
recommendation of the MCCG 2012 that the board should mandate the recruitment of female 
candidates and should disclose the policies and goals the company has on gender diversity in the 
annual reports. 
 
Moving on to the control variables, BSIZE is found to be insignificantly related to AFER, 
which shows that the size of the company is not a significant determinant of earnings forecasts 
accuracy for Malaysian companies issuing IPOs. This is supported by the findings of prior 
Malaysian studies, like Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006). Added to this, BIND is found to be 
negatively related to the level of earnings forecast errors, which shows that independent directors 
promote increased level of accuracy. However, the BIND coefficient is not statistically 
significant, a result that is consistent with that reported by Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and 
Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010) who found no significant relationship between board 
independence and earnings forecasts accuracy. 
 
Contrary to the expected argument concerning DUALITY, the findings in Table 4 show a 
negative relationship between DUALITY and AFER but the relationship is an insignificant one. 
This indicates that companies issuing IPOs that have separate CEO-Chairman positions are less 
inclined towards issuing accurate earnings forecasts. This result is consistent with that reported 





































Concerning the signaling variables, first, the UNDERW is found to be negatively related 
and statistically significant, indicating that the higher the underwriter’s reputation, the more 
accurate the earnings forecasts. This is supported by prior findings by Jog and McConomy 
(2003) that show prestigious underwriters to be more adept at producing accurate earnings 
forecasts compared to their less reputable counterparts. This result may be related to the 
underwriter’s attempt to maintain his/her reputation through the provision of more accurate 
earnings forecasts. With regards to AUD, expectations are met when a significant and negative 
association is found between AUD and AFER as reported by Jelic et al. (1998). This result 
indicates that more qualified auditors are related to superior accuracy of earnings forecasts in 
Malaysia. This is consistent also with the result revealed by Ahamd-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin 
(2010). 
 
Surprisingly, CSIZE is found to be positively and significantly related to AFER, 
indicating that larger Malaysian companies issuing IPOs tend to issue less accurate earnings 
forecasts, a result that is aligned with those reported in Malaysia and in New Zealand by Ahmad-
Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010) and Firth and Smith (1992), respectively. More specifically, Firth 
and Smith (1992) explain that because large companies issuing IPOs frequently raise funds, their 
management encounters the challenge of controlling the use of the funds and in forecasting 
future earnings resulting from the use of the funds. 
  
In terms of CAGE, the findings show a negative but insignificant relationship with AFER 
among the companies issuing IPOs. To some extent, the result shows that earnings forecasts 
accuracy improves the longer the company has been in existence. For the FHORIZON, the 





































shows that earnings forecast is naturally uncertain in actual practice, i.e., the longer the period of 
earnings forecasts, the higher will be the related uncertainty. Therefore, when the IPO earnings 
forecast period is long, the accuracy will be less. 
 
 4.4 Robustness test 
Another additional test was conducted to confirm the sensitivity and robustness of the main 
findings reported earlier. Specifically, the study tested whether the findings of regression 
analysis are sensitive to utilizing a substitute measure for earnings forecasts accuracy. In the 
above analysis, we used AFER to measure the accuracy of earnings forecasts. For the robustness 
test, we employed the squared forecasts error (SQFER). Firth and Smith (1992) posit that the 
squared forecast error provides more weight to great errors, and is more suitable for analyzing 
investors’ losses that result from the forecast errors. The squared forecast error is estimated as: 
 (SQFERit = [(AEit - FEit ) / FEit ] 2) 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results in Table 5 show that the significance level of SQFER model is similar to the initial 
results of the AFER model. For the relationships of the experimental variable (GENDER) and 
other control variables with SQFER, it is clear that the results are similar to those of the initial 
regression analysis using AFER as proxy for earnings forecasts accuracy in Table 4.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Gender diversity of the board of directors and audit committee has been the major focus of 





































diversity are still ambiguous. Our study extends the literature on earnings forecast accuracy, 
gender diversity and corporate governance. The specific contribution of our paper is that it 
investigates whether gender diversity impacts the accuracy of earnings forecasts of companies 
issuing IPOs. Further, this paper is important as gender diversity has increasingly been 
acknowledged as being of societal importance by regulators. Our study also helps in recognizing 
why there is value improvement for companies with diverse boards. 
 
 
The findings show a significant relationship with a negative impact of female directors in 
the audit committee on accuracy of earnings forecasts, which highlights the concerns of the 
advantages of recruiting more female directors in Malaysian companies issuing IPOs as 
suggested by MCCG 2012. The finding evidences the inefficacy of this policy on the accuracy of 
IPO earnings forecasts. On the basis of this result, more investigation is called for to 
acknowledge the difficulties faced by female directors in promoting better practices of corporate 
governance and in adding value to the forecasts. The study also finds quality of underwriters and 
auditors to be significantly and positively related to the accuracy of earnings forecasts. 
Notwithstanding the findings, the study is a significant step in providing insights into whether or 
not greater female directors’ participation on corporate boards in Malaysian IPOs enhances the 
corporate governance of the boards. 
 
This study has several important implications. First, it has an important practical 
implication that the regulators should move to increase the representation of females on 
corporate boards. Second, this study’s findings are expected to assist management and 
shareholders of Malaysian companies issuing IPOs who are desirous of improving financial 





































significance of superior corporate governance practices when it comes to enhancing quality, 
transparency and reliability of financial disclosure and reporting. Moreover, decision-makers 
may measure the effect of monitoring systems (e.g., audit committee) in order to assess its role in 
supporting the awareness of information quality among shareholders. Upon receiving quality 
information regarding company performance, shareholders are enabled to make wiser decisions. 
 
Finally, our study is subject to some limitations, some of which recommend directions for 
future studies. This study is limited to the examination of the impact of gender diversity on the 
issue of earnings forecasts accuracy. Future studies may examine the impact of gender diversity 
of boards and audit committees on other IPO issues, like IPO performance in the long-run. 
Further, future studies may examine whether other features of female directors (e.g., tenure, 
education, age, etc.) could impact the accuracy of IPO earnings forecasts accuracy. In addition, 
since women representation is limited in audit committees of companies issuing IPOs in 
Malaysia, their actual impact on earnings forecasts accuracy may also be limited, but this 
provides yet another direction for future studies to investigate this issue in countries where the 
representation of women on companies’ boards is big. Finally, a promising area for future studies 
is to examine the impact of CEO and CFO gender on IPO earnings forecasts accuracy since they 
are involved directly in the activities of management. Last but not least, this study is limited in 
its sample as it is only confined to Malaysian data, and thus, the findings have to be generalized 
with caution to other countries’ stock markets. This is because of different attributes of capital 
markets in terms of size, number of companies issuing IPOs and the market valuation, practices 







































1. The MCCG (2012) mandates that the board should: 1) establish a policy to make sure that the 
boardroom is diverse; 2) make sure that female candidates are included on the board; and 3) 
report policies on gender diversity, the objectives and measures taken to meet the objectives in 
the annual report.  
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Descriptive statistics  
Variables    Mean  Median        SD         Min.       Max. 
AFER (%)  24.94 9.37 48.54 0.13 525.45 
GENDER (%)   7.96 0.00 15.21 0.00   66.67 
BSIZE   7.37 7.00  1.76 4.00   16.00 
BIND (%) 37.57     33.33  8.38      22.22   75.00 
DUALITY (%) 16.32 - - - - 
UNDERW (%) 19.05     10.45 19.18 0.13   49.11 
AUD (%) 54.74 - - - - 
CSIZE(RM million)   350.11   101.19  1,402.58      35.12 17,073.86 
CAGE (years)  5.53 2.25   6.95 0.17    32.67 
FHORIZON (months)  7.71 7.00   3.01 3.00    14.00 
      
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of dependent, independent and control variables of the 
190 companies issuing IPO utilized in this study. AFER is the absolute forecast error measured by taking 
the absolute value of the difference between actual earnings and the forecasted earnings scaled by the 
absolute earnings forecasts. GENDER is the proportion of female directors on the audit committee to 
total number of directors on the committee at the IPO date. BSIZE is the total number of directors on the 
board at the IPO date. BIND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board to 
total number of directors on board at the IPO date. DUALITY is a binary variable taking the value of one 
“1” if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, otherwise DUALITY is coded zero “0”. UNDERW is 
the ringgit value of all shares underwritten by the underwriter deflated by the total ringgit value of all 
IPO samples. AUD is a binary variable that take the value of one “1” if the IPO company is audited by 
Big 4 auditor firm, otherwise AUD is coded zero “0”. CSIZE is the size of IPO company measured by 
the logarithm of total assets, at the date of IPO. CAGE is the age of IPO company measured by the 
logarithm of (1+ number of years from the date of incorporation to the date of IPO prospectus). 
FHORIZON is the length of the earnings forecasts period measured as the number of months from the 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Multivariate analysis of the effect of audit committee female directors on the 
accuracy of IPO management earnings forecasts 
 Expected sign Coefficient t-stat VIF 
Experimental variable     
GENDER - 0.157 2.20** 1.06 
Control variables     
BSIZE - -0.566 -0.87 1.18 
BIND - -0.025 -0.18 1.13 
DUALITY + -2.633 -0.88 1.07 
UNDERW - -0.140 -2.43*** 1.10 
AUD - -5.034 -2.22** 1.12 
CSIZE - 3.255 2.71*** 1.17 
CAGE - -1.303 -1.00 1.09 
FHORIZON + 0.481 1.29 1.04 
Constant  -15.812 -1.01  
n  173   
R-square %  11.48   
Adjusted R-square %  6.60   
F-value  2.35***   
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS multivariate regression of the association between audit 
committee female directors and management earnings forecasts accuracy. The dependent variable 
AFER is the absolute forecast error measured as the absolute value of the difference between actual 
earnings and the forecasted earnings scaled by the absolute earnings forecasts. The main tested 
variable is audit committee gender (GENDER) measured as the proportion of female directors on the 
audit committee to total number of directors on the committee at the IPO date. The control variables 
are: BSIZE is the total number of directors on the board at the IPO date, BIND is the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on the board to total number of directors on board at the IPO 
date, DUALITY is a binary variable taking the value of one “1” if the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board, otherwise DUALITY is coded zero “0”, UNDERW is the ringgit value of all shares 
underwritten by the underwriter deflated by the total ringgit value of all IPO samples, AUD is a 
binary variable that takes the value of one “1” if the IPO company is audited by Big 4 auditor firm, 
otherwise AUD is coded zero “0”, CSIZE is the size of IPO company measured by the logarithm of 
total assets, at the date of IPO, CAGE is the age of IPO company measured by the logarithm of (1+ 
number of years from the date of incorporation to the date of IPO prospectus), and FHORIZON is the 
length of the earnings forecasts period measured as the number of months from the date of IPO 
prospectus to the end of year which the earnings forecasts pertains. Multivariate outliers are 
recognized when the absolute values of the observations’ studentized residuals equal to two or 
higher. Thus, by employing the studentized residuals test, seventeen IPOs have been excluded from 









































Table 5.  
Multivariate analysis of the effect of audit committee female directors on the accuracy of 
IPO management earnings forecasts using SQFER as alternative measurement for the 
forecast accuracy  
 Expected sign Coefficient t-stat VIF 
Experimental variable     
GENDER - 0.075 2.14** 1.06 
Control variables     
BSIZE  - -0.142 -0.44 1.18 
BIND  - -0.029 -0.42 1.13 
DUALITY + -1.511 -1.03 1.07 
UNDERW - -0.062 -2.17** 1.10 
AUD - -3.385 -3.03*** 1.12 
CSIZE - 1.670 2.82*** 1.17 
CAGE - -0.591 -0.92 1.09 
FHORIZON + 0.264 1.44 1.04 
constant  -11.811 -1.52  
n  173   
R-square %  12.87   
Adjusted R-square %  8.05   
F-value  2.67***   
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS multivariate regression of the association between audit 
committee female directors and management earnings forecasts accuracy. The dependent variable SQFER is 
the squared forecast error measured as the squared of the difference between actual earnings and the 
forecasted earnings scaled by the earnings forecasts. The main tested variable is audit committee gender 
(GENDER) measured as the proportion of female directors on the audit committee to total number of 
directors on the committee at the IPO date. The control variables are: BSIZE is the total number of directors 
on the board at the IPO date, BIND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board to 
total number of directors on board at the IPO date, DUALITY is a binary variable taking the value of one “1” 
if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, otherwise DUALITY is coded zero “0”, UNDERW is the ringgit 
value of all shares underwritten by the underwriter deflated by the total ringgit value of all IPO samples, AUD 
is a binary variable that take the value of one “1” if the IPO company is audited by Big 4 auditor firm, 
otherwise AUD is coded zero “0”, CSIZE is the size of IPO company measured by the logarithm of total 
assets, at the date of IPO, CAGE is the age of IPO company measured by the logarithm of (1+ number of 
years from the date of incorporation to the date of IPO prospectus), and FHORIZON is the length of the 
earnings forecasts period measured as the number of months from the date of IPO prospectus to the end of 
year which the earnings forecasts pertains. Multivariate outliers are recognized when the absolute values of 
the observations’ studentized residuals equal to two or higher. Thus, by employing the studentized residuals 
test, seventeen IPOs have been excluded from the total sample. **, and *** indicates significance at the 5%, 
and 1% levels for two-tailed tests. 
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